# Security Communication RootCA Time-Stamp Service Certificate Policy Version 5.10

October 23, 2024 SECOM Trust Systems Co., Ltd.

Version History					
Version Number	Date	Description			
V1.00	2004.11.08	Publication of the first version			
V2.00	2006.05.22	"SECOM TrustNet" was renamed to "SECOM Trust			
<b>V</b> 2.00	2000.05.22	Systems" after the merger.			
		"SECOM TrustNet Security Policy Committee" was			
		renamed as "Certification Services Improvement			
		Committee."			
V3.00	2009.05.29	Major version upgrade			
		Renaming of "Security Communication RootCA1			
		Time-Stamp Service Certificate Policy" to "Security			
		Communication RootCA Time-Stamp Service Certificate			
		Policy" and addition of the CA Private Key "Security			
		Communication RootCA2"			
V4.00	2016.06.01	Major version upgrade			
		Addition of the CA Private Key "Security Communication			
		RootCA3"			
		Addition of the CA Private Key "Security Communication			
		ECC RootCA1"			
V5.00	2017.01.20	Amendment associated with commencement of the OCSP			
		server operations			
	20101120	Overall revision of the styles			
V5.01	2018.11.28	Overall revision of the descriptions and styles			
V5.02	2019.05.24	Overall revision of the descriptions and styles			
V5.03	2020.03.30	Revised chapters and added some "No Stipulation" content			
V5.04	2020.09.29	Revision of CRL basic area			
V5.05	2021.08.03	Addition of the Profile for Intermediate CA Certificate			
V5.06	2022.06.10	Overall revision of the descriptions and styles			
V5.07	2022.12.08				
	"Table 1.2-2 OID (this CP)"  Madification of "7.1.2 Contificate Entered and "				
		Modification of "7.1.2 Certificate Extensions"			
V5.08	2023.05.17	Overall revision of the descriptions and styles  Update "7.1 Certificate Profile"			
v 9.00	4040.00.17	Update "7.1.2 Certificate Extensions"			
		Opuate 1.1.2 Certificate Extensions			

# Security Communication RootCA Time Stamp Service Certificate Policy Ver.5.10

V5.09	2024.01.24	Delete the CA Private Key Security Communication		
		RootCA1		
		Delete the CA Private Key Security Communication ECC		
		RootCA1		
		Update "1.1 Overview"		
		Update "1.2 Document Name and Identification"		
		Update "1.6 Definitions and Acronyms"		
		Update "4.9.8 Maximum Latency for CRLs"		
		Update "7.1.2 Certificate Extensions"		
		Update "7.1.3 Algorithm Object Identifiers"		
		Update "7.3.2 OCSP Extensions"		
V5.10	2024.10.23	Update the below:		
		1.5.2 Contact Information		
		7.1.2 Certificate Extension		
		7.2.1 Version Number(s)		

# Table of Contents

1. Introduction	1
1.1 Overview	1
1.2 Document Name and Identification	1
1.3 PKI Participants	2
1.3.1 Certification Authorities	2
1.3.2 Registration Authorities	2
1.3.3 Subscribers	2
1.3.4 Relying Parties	3
1.3.5 Other Participants	3
1.4 Certificate Usage	3
1.4.1 Appropriate Certificate Uses	3
1.4.2 Prohibited Certificate Uses	3
1.5 Policy Administration	3
1.5.1 Organization Administering the Document	3
1.5.2 Contact Information	3
1.5.3 Person Determining CP Suitability for the Policy	4
1.5.4 Approval Procedure	4
1.6 Definitions and Acronyms	4
2. Publication and Repository Responsibilities	9
2.1 Repository	9
2.2 Publication of Certificate Information	9
2.3 Time or Frequency of Publication	9
2.4 Access Controls on Repositories	9
3. Identification and Authentication	10
3.1 Naming	10
3.1.1 Types of Names	10
3.1.2 Need for Names to Be Meaningful	10
3.1.3 Anonymity or Pseudonymity of Subscribers	10
3.1.4 Rules for Interpreting Various Name Forms	10
3.1.5 Uniqueness of Names	
3.1.6 Recognition, Authentication, and Roles of Trademarks	10
3.2 Initial Identity Validation	10
3.2.1 Method to Prove Possession of Private Key	10
3.2.2 Authentication of Organization Identity	11
3.2.2.1 Identity	11
3.2.2.2 DBA/Tradename	11
3.2.2.3 Verification of Country	12
3.2.3 Authentication of Individual Identity	12
3 2 4 Non-Verified Subscriber Information	12

3.2.5 Validation of Authority	12
3.2.6 Criteria for Interoperation	12
3.3 Identification and Authentication for Re-Key Requests	12
3.3.1 Identification and Authentication for Routine Re-Key	12
3.3.2 Identification and Authentication for Re-Key after Revocation	12
3.4 Identification and Authentication for Revocation Requests	12
4. Certificate Life-Cycle Operational Requirements	13
4.1 Certificate Application	13
4.1.1 Who Can Submit a Certificate Application	13
4.1.2 Enrollment Process and Responsibilities	13
4.2 Certificate Application Processing	13
4.2.1 Performing Identification and Authentication Functions	13
4.2.2 Approval or Rejection of Certificate Applications	13
4.2.3 Time to Process Certificate Applications	14
4.3 Certificate Issuance	14
4.3.1 CA Actions during Certificate Issuance	14
4.3.2 Notifications to Subscriber of Certificate Issuance	14
4.4 Certificate Acceptance	14
4.4.1 Conduct Constituting Certificate Acceptance	14
4.4.2 Publication of the Certificate by the CA	14
4.4.3 Notification of Certificate Issuance by the CA to Other Entities	14
4.5 Key Pair and Certificate Usage	14
4.5.1 Subscriber Private Key and Certificate Usage	15
4.5.2 Relying Party Public Key and Certificate Usage	15
4.6 Certificate Renewal	15
4.6.1 Circumstances for Certificate Renewal	15
4.6.2 Who May Request Renewal	15
4.6.3 Processing Certificate Renewal Requests	15
4.6.4 Notification of New Certificate Issuance to Subscriber	15
4.6.5 Conduct Constituting Acceptance of a Renewal Certificate	15
4.6.6 Publication of the Renewal Certificates by the CA	15
4.6.7 Notification of Certificate Issuance by the CA to Other Entities	15
4.7 Certificate Re-Key	15
4.7.1 Circumstances for Certificate Re-Key	15
4.7.2 Who May Request Certification of a New Public Key	16
4.7.3 Processing Certificate Re-Keying Requests	
4.7.4 Notification of New Certificate Issuance to Subscriber	16
4.7.5 Conduct Constituting Acceptance of a Re-Keyed Certificate	16
4.7.6 Publication of the Re-Keyed Certificate by the CA	16
4.7.7 Notification of Certificate Issuance by the CA to Other Entities	16

4.8 Certificate Modification	16
4.8.1 Circumstances for Certificate Modification	16
4.8.2 Who May Request Certificate Modification	16
4.8.3 Processing Certificate Modification Requests	16
4.8.4 Notification of New Certificate Issuance to Subscriber	16
4.8.5 Conduct Constituting Acceptance of Modified Certificate	17
4.8.6 Publication of the Modified Certificate by the CA	17
4.8.7 Notification of Certificate Issuance by the CA to Other Entities	17
4.9 Certificate Revocation and Suspension	17
4.9.1 Circumstances for Certificate Revocation	17
4.9.2 Who Can Request Revocation	17
4.9.3 Procedure for Revocation Request	18
4.9.4 Revocation Request Grace Period	18
4.9.5 Time within Which CA Shall Process the Revocation Request	18
4.9.6 Revocation Checking Requirements for Relying Parties	18
4.9.7 CRL Issuance Frequency	18
4.9.8 Maximum Latency for CRLs.	18
4.9.9 On-Line Revocation/Status Checking Availability	18
4.9.10 On-Line Revocation/Status Checking Requirements	18
4.9.11 Other Forms of Revocation Advertisements Available	19
4.9.12 Special Requirements Regarding Key Compromise	19
4.9.13 Circumstances for Suspension	19
4.9.14 Who Can Request Suspension	20
4.9.15 Procedure for Suspension Request	20
4.9.16 Limits on Suspension Period	20
4.10 Certificate Status Services	20
4.10.1 Operational Characteristics	20
4.10.2 Service Availability	20
4.10.3 Optional Features	20
4.11 End of Subscription (Registry)	20
4.12 Key Escrow and Recovery	20
4.12.1 Key Escrow and Recovery Policy and Practices	20
4.12.2 Session Key Encapsulation and Recovery Policy and Practices	20
5. Facility, Management, and Operational Controls	21
5.1 Physical Controls	21
5.1.1Site Location and Construction	21
5.1.2 Physical Access	21
5.1.3 Power and Air Conditioning	21
5.1.4 Water Exposures	21
5.1.5 Fire Prevention and Protection	21

5.1.6 Media Storage	21
5.1.7 Waste Disposal	21
5.1.8 Off-Site Backup	21
5.2 Procedural Controls	21
5.2.1 Trusted Roles	21
5.2.2 Number of Persons Required per Task	21
5.2.3 Identification and Authentication for Each Role	21
5.2.4 Roles Requiring Separation of Duties	22
5.3 Personnel Controls	22
5.3.1 Qualifications, Experience, and Clearance Requirements	22
5.3.2 Background Check Procedures	22
5.3.3 Training Requirements	22
5.3.4 Retraining Frequency and Requirements	22
5.3.5 Job Rotation Frequency and Sequence	22
5.3.6 Sanctions for Unauthorized Actions	22
5.3.7 Independent Contractor Requirement	22
5.3.8 Documentation Supplied to Personnel	22
5.4 Audit Logging Procedures	22
5.4.1 Types of Events Recorded	22
5.4.2 Frequency of Processing Audit Log	22
5.4.3 Retention Period for Audit Log	22
5.4.4 Protection of Audit Log	23
5.4.5 Audit Log Backup Procedure	23
5.4.6 Audit Log Collection System	23
5.4.7 Notification to Event-Causing Subject	23
5.4.8 Vulnerability Assessments	23
5.5 Records Archival	23
5.5.1 Types of Records Archived	23
5.5.2 Retention Period for Archive	23
5.5.3 Protection of Archive	23
5.5.4 Archive Backup Procedures	23
5.5.5 Requirements for Time-Stamping of Records	23
5.5.6 Archive Collection System	23
5.5.7 Procedures to Obtain and Verify Archive Information	23
5.6 Key Changeover	23
5.7 Compromise and Disaster Recovery	24
5.7.1 Incident and Compromise Handling Procedures	24
5.7.2 Hardware, Software, and/or Data are Corrupted	24
5.7.3 Entity Private Key Compromise Procedures	24
5.7.4 Business Continuity Capabilities after a Disaster	24

	5.8 CA or RA Termination	$\dots 24$
6.	Technical Security Controls	25
	6.1 Key Pair Generation and Installation	25
	6.1.1 Key Pair Generation	25
	6.1.2 Private Key Delivery to Subscriber	25
	6.1.3 Public Key Delivery to Certificate Issuer	25
	6.1.4 CA Public Key Delivery to Relying Parties	25
	6.1.5 Key Sizes	25
	6.1.6 Public Key Parameters Generation and Quality Checking	25
	6.1.7 Key Usage Purposes	25
	$6.2\ Private\ Key\ Protection\ and\ Cryptographic\ Module\ Engineering\ Controls$	25
	6.2.1 Cryptographic Module Standards and Controls	25
	6.2.2 Private Key Multi-Person Control	25
	6.2.3 Private Key Escrow	25
	6.2.4 Private Key Backup	25
	6.2.5 Private Key Archive	26
	6.2.6 Private Key Transfer into or from a Cryptographic Module	26
	6.2.7 Private Key Storage on Cryptographic Module	26
	6.2.8 Method of Activating Private Key	26
	6.2.9 Method of Deactivating Private Key	26
	6.2.10 Method of Destroying Private Key	26
	6.2.11 Cryptographic Module Rating.	26
	6.3 Other Aspects of Key Pair Management	26
	6.3.1 Public Key Archival	26
	6.3.2 Certificate Operational Periods and Key Pair Usage Periods	26
	6.4 Activation Data	26
	6.4.1 Activation Data Generation and Installation	26
	6.4.2 Activation Data Protection	26
	6.4.3 Other Aspects of Activation Data	26
	6.5 Computer Security Controls	27
	6.5.1 Specific Computer Security Technical Requirements	27
	6.5.2 Computer Security Rating	27
	6.6 Life-Cycle Technical Controls.	27
	6.6.1 System Development Controls	27
	6.6.2 Security Management Controls	27
	6.6.3 Life-Cycle Security Controls	27
	6.7 Network Security Controls	
	6.8 Time-Stamping	27
7.	Certificate, CRL, and OCSP Profiles	28
	7.1 Certificate Profile	28

7.1.1 Version Number(s)	28
7.1.2 Certificate Extensions	28
7.1.3 Algorithm Object Identifiers	30
7.1.4 Name Forms	31
7.1.5 Name Constraints	31
7.1.6 Certificate Policy Object Identifier	31
7.1.7 Usage of Policy Constraints Extension	31
7.1.8 Policy Qualifiers Syntax and Semantics	31
7.1.9 Processing Semantics for the Critical Certificate Policies Extension	31
7.2 CRL Profile	31
7.2.1 Version Number(s)	32
7.2.2 CRL and CRL Entry Extensions	32
7.3 OCSP Profile	33
7.3.1 Version Number(s)	33
7.3.2 OCSP Extensions	33
8 Compliance Audit and Other Assessments	34
8.1 Frequency and Circumstances of Assessment	34
8.2 Identity/Qualifications of Assessor	34
8.3 Assessor's Relationship to Assessed Entity	34
8.4 Topics Covered by Assessment	34
8.5 Actions Taken as a Result of Deficiency	34
8.6 Communication of Results	34
8.7 Self-Audit	34
9. Other Business and Legal Matters	35
9.1 Fees	35
9.1.1 Certificate Issuance or Renewal Fees	35
9.1.2 Certificate Access Fees	35
9.1.3 Revocation or Status Information Access Fees	35
9.1.4 Fees for Other Services	35
9.1.5 Refund Policy	35
9.2 Financial Responsibility	35
9.2.1 Insurance Coverage	35
9.2.2 Other Assets	35
9.2.3 Insurance or Warranty Coverage for End-Entities	35
9.3 Confidentiality of Business Information	35
9.3.1 Scope of Confidential Information	35
9.3.2 Information Not Within the Scope of Confidential Information	36
9.3.3 Responsibility to Protect Confidential Information	36
9.4 Privacy of Personal Information	36
9.4.1 Personal Information Protection Plan	36

9.4.2 Information Treated as Personal Information	36
9.4.3 Information that is not considered Personal Information	37
9.4.4 Responsibility for protecting Personal Information	37
9.4.5 Notice and Consent regarding use of Personal Information	37
9.4.6 Disclosure of Information with Judicial or Administrative Procedu	ıres 37
9.4.7 Other Information Disclosure Conditions	37
9.5 Intellectual Property Rights	37
9.6 Representations and Warranties	38
9.6.1 CA Representations and Warranties	38
9.6.2 RA Representations and Warranties	40
9.6.3 Subscriber Representations and Warranties	40
9.6.4 Relying Party Representations and Warranties	40
9.6.5 Representations and Warranties of Other Participants	40
9.7 Disclaimers of Warranties	41
9.8 Limitations of Liability	41
9.9 Indemnities	41
9.10 Term and Termination	42
9.10.1 Term	42
9.10.2 Termination	42
9.10.3 Effect of Termination and Survival	42
9.11 Individual Notices and Communications with Participants	42
9.12 Amendments	42
9.12.1 Procedure for Amendment	42
9.12.2 Notification Mechanism and Period	42
9.12.3 Circumstances under Which OID Must Be Changed	43
9.13 Dispute Resolution Provisions	43
9.14 Governing Law	43
9.15 Compliance with Applicable Law	43
9.16 Miscellaneous Provisions	43
9.16.1 Entire Agreement	43
9.16.2 Assignment	43
9.16.3 Severability	43
9.16.4 Enforcement	44
9.16.5 Force Majeure	44
9.17 Other Provisions	44

#### 1. Introduction

#### 1.1 Overview

Security Communication RootCA Time-Stamp Service Certificate Policy (hereinafter, "this CP") is a document that defines operational policies for the TA (Time Authority) certificates, TSA (Time-Stamping Authority) certificates, and Subordinate CA certificate for TA, TSA certificate (hereinafter collectively, "Certificates") issued by Security Communication RootCA2, Security Communication RootCA3 (hereinafter collectively, "the CAs") that are all operated by SECOM Trust Systems Co., Ltd. (hereinafter, "SECOM"), by specifying the purpose of use, the scope of application and the user procedures for the Certificates. Various procedures regarding the operation and maintenance of the CAs are stipulated in the Security Communication RootCA Certification Practice Statement (hereinafter, "CPS").

SECOM provides the certification services as the CAs, including the CA key administration as well as issuance/revocation of Certificates (hereinafter, "the Services"). The Certificates issued by the CAs prove and certify the unique correspondence between the subjects of the issuance and their public keys.

CA for time stamp service for code signing conforms to the current version of the Baseline Requirements for the Issuance and Management of Publicly-Trusted Code Signing Certificates (hereinafter, Baseline Requirements) defined by CA/Browser Forum provisions disclosed at https://www.cabforum.org/.

Any provisions in this CP inconsistent with the CPS shall prevail and any provisions in a separate agreement or the like between the subscribers and SECOM inconsistent with this CP or the CPS shall prevail. In the event of any inconsistency between this CP and Baseline Requirements, Baseline Requirements take precedence over this CP.

This CP shall be revised as necessary in order to reflect any technical or service developments or improvements pertaining to the CA operations.

This CPS conforms to the RFC3647 "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate Policy and Certification Practices Framework" advocated by the IETF as a CA practice framework.

# 1.2 Document Name and Identification

The official name of this CP is "Security Communication RootCA Time-Stamp Service Certificate Policy". SECOM, which is the provider and operational body of the Services, uses the Object IDentifier (hereinafter, "OID") assigned by ISO, given in the Table "1.2-1 OID (SECOM)" below.

Table 1.2-1 OID (SECOM)

Name of organization	OID
SECOM Trust Systems Co., Ltd.	1.2.392.200091

This CP is identified with the Object IDentifier (hereinafter, "OID") given in "Table 1.2-2 OID (This CP)"

Table 1.2-2 OID (This CP)

CP	OID
Security Communication RootCA2 Time-Stamp Service CP	1.2.392.200091.100.901.5
Security Communication RootCA3 Time-Stamp Service CP	1.2.392.200091.100.901.7

The OID of the CPS associated with this CP is given in Table 1.2-3 OID (The CPS)

Table 1.2-3 OID (The CPS)

CPS	OID
Security Communication RootCA Certification Practice	1.2.392.200091.100.901.3
Statement	1.2.392.200091.100.901.3

# 1.3 PKI Participants

#### 1.3.1 Certification Authorities

A CA mainly issues or revokes Certificates, publishes CRLs (Certificate Revocation Lists), and stores and provides information on Certificate status using the OCSP server.

#### 1.3.2 Registration Authorities

An RA mainly performs identification, authentication, as well as assessment of the operation rules of the Certificate applicant organizations or institutions when such a Certificate request as issuance or revocation is submitted.

#### 1.3.3 Subscribers

Subscribers are organizations or institutions that generate Key Pairs in their own rights, to which Certificates are issued by the CAs. They are qualified as Subscribers upon accepting the Certificates issued by the CAs after submitting the Certificate applications thereto. Subscribers must assess this CP and the CPS in light of their usage purposes, and agree thereto.

#### 1.3.4 Relying Parties

Relying Parties are the entities that authenticate the validity of Certificates issued by the CAs. Relying Parts are assumed to be performing the authentication and placing trust upon confirming and agreeing to the contents of this CP and the CPS in light of the Relying Parties' own purposes of use.

#### 1.3.5 Other Participants

Other Parties include auditors, and companies or organizations that have service contracts with SECOM Trust Systems, and companies that perform system integration.

## 1.4 Certificate Usage

#### 1.4.1 Appropriate Certificate Uses

The CAs are the Certification Authorities functioning as top of the Subordinate CAs, and issue not only the Certificates (TA, TSA) but also the Subordinate CA Certificates for TA and TSA as Subscriber certificates. Relying Parties that trust and use the Certificates may authenticate the reliability of such Certificates using the CA public key Certificates.

#### 1.4.2 Prohibited Certificate Uses

Certificates issued by the CAs may not be used for purposes other than those set forth in this CP.

# 1.5 Policy Administration

#### 1.5.1 Organization Administering the Document

This CP is maintained and administered by SECOM.

#### 1.5.2 Contact Information

Inquiries concerning this CP should be directed to:

Contact Information	CA Support Center, SECOM Trust Systems Co., Ltd.
Address	8-10-16 Shimorennjaku, Mitaka-shi, Tokyo 181-8528

Inquiry details	Inquiries for this CP
	Except for Certificate Problem Report
E-mail	ca-support@secom.co.jp
Business hours	9:00-18:00 (except Saturdays, Sundays, national holidays, and
	year-end and New Year holidays)

The Subscribers, Relying Parties, Application Software Suppliers, and other third © 2004 SECOM Trust Systems Co., Ltd.

parties can report suspected Private Key Compromise, Certificate misuse, or other types of fraud, compromise, misuse, inappropriate conduct, or any other matter related to Certificates. The CAs revoke certificates when it is determined that it needs to be revoked.

Inquiry details	Certificate Problem Report
URL	https://www.secomtrust.net/sts/cert/report_entry.html
Business hours	24x7

#### 1.5.3 Person Determining CP Suitability for the Policy

Suitability of this CP as the CAs' practice policy is determined by SECOM's Certification Services Improvement Committee.

# 1.5.4 Approval Procedure

This CP shall be published in the repository as developed and revised under approval of the SECOM Certification Services Improvement Committee.

# 1.6 Definitions and Acronyms

#### $\underline{A} \sim \underline{Z}$

#### Application Software Supplier

A supplier of Internet browser software or other relying-party application software that displays or uses Certificates and incorporates Root Certificates.

# Attestation Letter

A letter attesting that Subject Information is correct, which is written by an accountant, lawyer, government official, or other reliable third party customarily relied upon for such information.

#### Audit Log

Behavioral, access and other histories pertaining to the CA systems which are recorded for inspection of access to and unauthorized operation of the CA systems.

#### Baseline Requirements

A document in which the CA/Browser Forum sets out the basic requirements for issuing and managing certificates.

# CA

CA stands for Certification Authority, an entity that mainly issues, renews and © 2004 SECOM Trust Systems Co., Ltd.

revokes Certificates, generates and protects CA Private Keys, and registers Subscribers.

#### CA/Browser Forum

An NPO organized by CAs and Internet browser vendors that works to define and standardize the Certificate issuance requirements.

# Certificate

The word "Certificate" is simply used to indicate a digital certificate in this CP which is the electronic data certifying that a public key is owned by the party specified therein. The validity of a Certificate is certified by the digital signature of the relevant CA affixed thereto.

#### Certification Services Improvement Committee

The decision making body for the operational policy of the Services, including administration of this CP and modification reviews.

#### CP

CP stands for Certificate Policy, a document that sets forth the policy regarding the Certificates.

#### CPS

CPS stands for Certification Practice Statement, which sets forth provisions to be followed in providing and subscribing to the Services, including applications of digital Certificates, application reviews, and issuance/revocation/storage/publication of Certificates by the CAs.

#### CRL

CRL stands for Certificate Revocation List, which records the list of Certificates revoked by the CAs.

#### CSR

CSR stands for Certificate Signing Request, a data file on which the digital certificate issuance is based. A CSR contains the public key of the entity requesting the Certificate signing, to which the issuer's digital signature is affixed upon the issuance thereof.

#### Digital Signature/Signing

A digital data to prove that a specific individual is the author of a specific digital documentation. It is a signature representing that the reliability of the information contained in such documentation is certified by the author.

# Escrow

Escrow means the placement (entrustment) of an asset in the control of an independent third party.

#### **Key Pair**

A Key Pair consists of a private key and a public key in the public key cryptosystem.

# Major Version Number

A number to be given to a revision of this CP (e.g., the underlined digit [1] of Version 1.02) whose magnitude of the amendment(s) thereof is considered to have an obvious impact on the use of the Certificates and the CRLs by Subscribers and Relying Parties.

#### Minor Version Number

A number to be given to a revision of this CP (e.g., the underlined digit [02] of Version 1.02) whose magnitude of the amendment(s) thereof is considered to have no or less impact on the use of the Certificates and the CRLs by Subscribers and Relying Parties.

#### OCSP (Online Certificate Status Protocol)

A protocol for real-time provision of information on Certificate status.

#### OID (Object Identifier)

A unique numeric identifier registered by the international registration authority, in a framework to maintain and administer the uniqueness of the mutual connectivity, services and other aspects of the networks.

#### PKI (Public Key Infrastructure)

An infrastructure for use of the encryption technology known as the public key cryptosystem to realize such security technologies as digital signature, encryption and certification.

# Private Key

A key comprising a Key Pair used in the public key cryptosystem, which corresponds to a public key and is possessed only by the relevant Subscriber.

#### Public Key

A key of a Key Pair used in the Public Key cryptosystem. A Public Key corresponds to

the Private Key and is published.

#### RA

RA stands for Registration Authority, an entity that conducts qualifications (identification and authentication) among the CA operations in the Services.

#### Relying Party

Any natural person or Legal Entity that relies on a Valid Certificate. An Application Software Supplier is not considered a Relying Party when software distributed by such Supplier merely displays information relating to a Certificate.

# Repository

The storage for such data as Certificates issued by the CAs. The Repository is a mechanism to allow access by the users or applications to the Certificates from any point in the network. CRLs as well as this CP are also stored in the Repository.

#### RFC3647 (Request for Comments 3647)

A document defining the framework for CP and CPS published by the IETF (The Internet Engineering Task Force), an industry group which establishes technical standards for the Internet.

#### Root CA

The Security Communication RootCA described in this CP is an institute owned and run by SECOM as a Root CA that issues the subordinate CA Certificates and functions as top of the subordinate CAs.

#### **RSA**

One of the most standard encryption technologies widely used in the Public Key cryptosystem.

#### SHA-1 (Secure Hash Algorithm 1)

A hash function used in digital signing. A hash function is a computation technique for generating a fixed-length string from a given text. The hash length is 160 bits. The algorithm works to detect any alterations in the original message during the transmission by comparing the hash values transmitted and received.

#### SHA-2

A Secure Hash Algorithm family function used in digital signing and the improved version of SHA-1. The size of the SHA-256 and SHA-384 described in this CP are respectively 256 and 384 bits. The algorithm works to detect any alterations in the

original message during the transmission by comparing the hash values transmitted and received.

# Subordinate CA

A CA trusted and signed by the CAs.

#### WebTrust for CA

Standards of internal control and a certification framework based thereon maintained by CPA Canada regarding the reliability of CAs, the security of electronic commerce transactions, and other relevant matters.

# X.500

X.500 is a series of directory standards that was developed by ITU-T in order to provide a range of services from the name and address lookup to the query by attribute value. The X.500 Distinguished Names (DN) will be used for the names of the X.509 Issuers and Subjects.

#### X.509

The Certificate and CRL formats set forth by X.509 ITU-T. With [X.509 v3 (Version 3)], extension fields were additionally defined for storage of optional data.

- 2. Publication and Repository Responsibilities
- 2.1 RepositoryStipulated in the CPS.
- 2.2 Publication of Certificate Information Stipulated in the CPS.
- 2.3 Time or Frequency of Publication Stipulated in the CPS.
- 2.4 Access Controls on Repositories Stipulated in the CPS.

#### 3. Identification and Authentication

# 3.1 Naming

#### 3.1.1 Types of Names

The certificate issued by the CAs meets the requirements of the X.509 standard, RFC5280 standard and Baseline Requirements (CA for time stamp service for code signing), and the distinguished name assigned to the certificate holder is set according to the X.500 Distinguished Name format and this CP "7.1.4 Name Forms"

# 3.1.2 Need for Names to Be Meaningful

The Distinguished Names assigned to Subscribers shall be meaningful, and the Subjects' names specified in Certificates shall have association with the organizations or the institutions to an appropriate extent.

Subscribers shall not submit Certificate applications with third parties' trademarks or associated names to the CAs.

# 3.1.3 Anonymity or Pseudonymity of Subscribers

No anonym nor pseudonym shall be used as Subject names specified in Certificates.

# 3.1.4 Rules for Interpreting Various Name Forms

Distinguished Names are interpreted as defined in "3.1.1 Types of Names" and "3.1.2 Need for Names to Be Meaningful" hereof.

#### 3.1.5 Uniqueness of Names

The uniqueness of each subject name in Certificates shall be enforced across the Certificates issued by the CAs.

#### 3.1.6 Recognition, Authentication, and Roles of Trademarks

Rights to use the trademarks shall be reserved by the trademark owners. The CAs may, as necessary, require the trademark owners to present such official documentation as the submission for the trademark.

#### 3.2 Initial Identity Validation

#### 3.2.1 Method to Prove Possession of Private Key

The signature on the relevant CSR made by a Certificate applicant is authenticated to prove that such CSR is signed with the Private Key corresponding to the Public Key contained therein. In addition, the fingerprint of the CSR is inspected to identify the Public Key owner.

# 3.2.2 Authentication of Organization Identity

Certificate applicants shall provide the CAs with the following information in submitting a Certificate Application:

- · Certificate Application Form;
- records or information to prove the (legal) existence of the organization or institution;
- · CSR; and
- · other documentation required by SECOM.

The CAs use the provided information to make sure that there is no inaccuracy or missing information in the application.

#### **3.2.2.1** Identity

If the Subject Identity Information is to include the name or address of an organization, the CA shall verify the identity and address of the organization and that the address is the Applicant's address of existence or operation. The CA shall verify the identity and address of the Applicant using documentation provided by, or through communication with, at least one of the following:

- 1. A government agency in the jurisdiction of the Applicant's legal creation, existence, or recognition;
- 2. A third party database that is periodically updated and considered a Reliable Data
- 3. A site visit by the CA or a third party who is acting as an agent for the CA; or
- 4. An Attestation Letter.

The CAs may use the same documentation or communication described in 1 through 4 above to verify both the Applicant's identity and address.

#### 3.2.2.2 DBA/Tradename

If the Subject Identity Information is to include a DBA or tradename, the CAs shall verify the Applicant's right to use the DBA/tradename using at least one of the following:

- 1. Documentation provided by, or communication with, a government agency in the jurisdiction of the Applicant's legal creation, existence, or recognition;
- 2. A Reliable Data Source;
- 3. Communication with a government agency responsible for the management of such DBAs or tradenames;
- 4. An Attestation Letter accompanied by documentary support; or
- 5. A utility bill, bank statement, credit card statement, government-issued tax document, or other form of identification that the CAs determine to be reliable.

#### 3.2.2.3 Verification of Country

If the subject:countryName field is present, then the CAs shall verify the country associated with the Subject using one of the following:

- · Information provided by the Domain Name Registrar; or
- · A method identified in this CP "3.2.2.1 Identity".

#### 3.2.3 Authentication of Individual Identity

The CAs will not issue Certificates to individuals.

#### 3.2.4 Non-Verified Subscriber Information

The CAs will not verify "Organizational Unit" with the documentary submission of the Certificate application by Subscribers and the CSR information.

# 3.2.5 Validation of Authority

Representatives, employees or agents of Certificate applicant organizations or institutions who submit information about such organizations or institutions are authenticated by the CAs to prove that they have the legitimate authority to do so.

#### 3.2.6 Criteria for Interoperation

This CA issues a unilateral cross-certificate to the CA identified and authenticated by this CA based on this CP.

- 3.3 Identification and Authentication for Re-Key Requests
- 3.3.1 Identification and Authentication for Routine Re-Key

The procedure set forth in "3.2 Initial Identity Validation" hereof shall be followed.

#### 3.3.2 Identification and Authentication for Re-Key after Revocation

The procedure set forth in "3.2 Initial Identity Validation" hereof shall be followed.

#### 3.4 Identification and Authentication for Revocation Requests

When a Certificate revocation request is accepted, legitimacy of the request is authenticated by the CAs based on the submitted Subscriber information.

#### 4. Certificate Life-Cycle Operational Requirements

# 4.1 Certificate Application

#### 4.1.1 Who Can Submit a Certificate Application

A Certificate Application can be submitted by representatives, employees or agents of the applicant organizations or institutions.

#### 4.1.2 Enrollment Process and Responsibilities

Prior to the issuance of a Certificate, the CAs shall obtain the following documentation from the Applicant:

- 1. A certificate request, which may be electronic; and
- 2. An executed Subscriber Agreement or Terms of Use, which may be electronic.

The CAs should obtain any additional documentation the CAs determine necessary to meet these Requirements.

Prior to the issuance of a Certificate, the CAs shall obtain from the Applicant a certificate request in a form prescribed by the CAs (CA for time stamp service for code signing) and that complies with these Requirements. One certificate request may suffice for multiple Certificates to be issued to the same Applicant, subject to the aging and updating requirement of this CP "4.2.1 Performing Identification and Authentication Functions", provided that each Certificate is supported by a valid, current certificate request signed by the appropriate Applicant Representative on behalf of the Applicant. The certificate request may be made, submitted and/or signed electronically.

The certificate request must contain a request from, or on behalf of, the Applicant for the issuance of a Certificate, and a certification by, or on behalf of, the Applicant that all of the information contained therein is correct.

#### 4.2 Certificate Application Processing

#### 4.2.1 Performing Identification and Authentication Functions

Accepting the applications by the Certificate applicants, the documentary submissions as well as the CSR are authenticated by the CAs in accordance with "3.2 Initial Identification and Authentication" hereof.

# 4.2.2 Approval or Rejection of Certificate Applications

The CAs decide approval or rejection of the Certificate Applications according to the prescribed authentication procedure for the Certificate applicant submissions, and notify the applicants of the results thereof.

#### 4.2.3 Time to Process Certificate Applications

The CAs promptly issue Certificates once the CSRs submitted by the Certificate applicants are approved.

#### 4.3 Certificate Issuance

#### 4.3.1 CA Actions during Certificate Issuance

The CAs issue Certificates containing the CA Private Key signature for the Public Key of the CSR submitted by the Subscriber conforming to "7.1 Certificate Profile" hereof. Certificate issuance by the CAs shall require an individual authorized by the CAs (i.e. the CA system operator, system officer, or PKI administrator) to deliberately issue a direct command in order for the CA to perform a certificate signing operation. The backdating of a certificate's notBefore date to avoid a deadline, prohibition or

The backdating of a certificate's notBefore date to avoid a deadline, prohibition or code-enforced restriction is not used by the CAs.

# 4.3.2 Notifications to Subscriber of Certificate Issuance

After completing the issuance of Certificates for approved Certificate Applications, the CAs store the issued Certificates on such external memory media, seal them together with the receipts, and then personally deliver or just send them to the Subscriber applicants.

#### 4.4 Certificate Acceptance

# 4.4.1 Conduct Constituting Certificate Acceptance

Subscribers must send the receipts to the CAs upon confirming how the Certificate is populated and no deficiency therein, while the CAs assume the Certificate Acceptance is complete upon receiving such receipts. The Certificate applicants must promptly notify the CAs if any deficiency is found in how the Certificate is populated. Any claims thereon must be made within fourteen (14) days of the date the Certificate is sent.

#### 4.4.2 Publication of the Certificate by the CA

The TA, TSA Certificates and the Subordinate CA Certificates for TA, TSA Certificates issued by the CAs are published in the Repository.

# 4.4.3 Notification of Certificate Issuance by the CA to Other Entities The CAs will not issue Certificates to individuals.

#### 4.5 Key Pair and Certificate Usage

#### 4.5.1 Subscriber Private Key and Certificate Usage

The usage of Certificates issued by the CAs and Private Keys possessed by Subscribers is restricted to those specified for the services and products provided by the Subscribers of the CAs having contractual relationship with SECOM. Certificates issued by the CAs shall not be used otherwise.

### 4.5.2 Relying Party Public Key and Certificate Usage

Relying Parties shall acknowledge and agree to the provisions of this CP and the CPS before using and authenticating the Certificates issued by the CAs.

#### 4.6 Certificate Renewal

The CAs do not accept Certificate Renewal without Subscriber Key Pair re-keying. In renewing a Certificate, a new Key Pair shall be generated, following the procedure set forth in "4.7 Certificate Re-Key".

#### 4.6.1 Circumstances for Certificate Renewal

Refer to this CP "4.7.1 Circumstances for Certificate Re-Key ".

# 4.6.2 Who May Request Renewal

Refer to this CP "4.7.2 Who May Request Certification of a New Public Key ".

#### 4.6.3 Processing Certificate Renewal Requests

Refer to this CP "4.7.3 Processing Certificate Re-Keying Requests ".

#### 4.6.4 Notification of New Certificate Issuance to Subscriber

Refer to this CP "4.7.4 Notification of New Certificate Issuance to Subscriber ".

#### 4.6.5 Conduct Constituting Acceptance of a Renewal Certificate

Refer to this CP "4.7.5 Conduct Constituting Acceptance of a Re-Keyed Certificate ".

#### 4.6.6 Publication of the Renewal Certificates by the CA

Refer to this CP "4.7.6 Publication of the Re-Keyed Certificate by the CA ".

#### 4.6.7 Notification of Certificate Issuance by the CA to Other Entities

Refer to this CP "4.7.7 Notification of Certificate Issuance by the CA to Other Entities ".

#### 4.7 Certificate Re-Key

#### 4.7.1 Circumstances for Certificate Re-Key

A Certificate is Re-Keyed when the validity period of the Certificate is about to expire or

when the Certificate is revoked due to the key compromise.

# 4.7.2 Who May Request Certification of a New Public Key

The provisions of "4.1.1 Who Can Submit a Certificate Application" hereof shall apply.

#### 4.7.3 Processing Certificate Re-Keying Requests

The provisions of "4.2 Certificate Application Processing" hereof shall apply.

#### 4.7.4 Notification of New Certificate Issuance to Subscriber

The provisions of "4.3.2 Notifications to Subscriber of Certificate Issuance" hereof shall apply.

# 4.7.5 Conduct Constituting Acceptance of a Re-Keyed Certificate

The provisions of "4.4.1 Conduct Constituting Certificate Acceptance" hereof shall apply.

# 4.7.6 Publication of the Re-Keyed Certificate by the CA

The provisions of "4.4.2 Publication of the Certificate by the CA" hereof shall apply.

# 4.7.7 Notification of Certificate Issuance by the CA to Other Entities

The provisions of "4.4.3 Notification of Certificate Issuance by the CA to Other Entities" hereof shall apply.

# 4.8 Certificate Modification

#### 4.8.1 Circumstances for Certificate Modification

If any of the descriptions in a Certificate has to be modified, the Subscriber must promptly submit a Certificate Modification application. Procedures for the revocation and initial issuance shall be followed as the procedure for re-issuance by the modification.

#### 4.8.2 Who May Request Certificate Modification

The provisions of "4.9.2 Who Can Request Revocation" and "4.1.1 Who Can Submit a Certificate Application" hereof shall apply.

# 4.8.3 Processing Certificate Modification Requests

The provisions of "4.9.3 Procedure for Revocation Request" and "4.2 Certificate Application Processing" hereof shall apply.

# 4.8.4 Notification of New Certificate Issuance to Subscriber

The provisions of "4.3.2 Notifications to Subscriber of Certificate Issuance" hereof shall

apply.

# 4.8.5 Conduct Constituting Acceptance of Modified Certificate

The provisions of "4.4.1 Conduct Constituting Certificate Acceptance" hereof shall apply.

# 4.8.6 Publication of the Modified Certificate by the CA

The provisions of "4.4.2 Publication of the Certificate by the CA" hereof shall apply.

# 4.8.7 Notification of Certificate Issuance by the CA to Other Entities

The provisions of "4.4.3 Notification of Certificate Issuance by the CA to Other Entities" hereof shall apply.

#### 4.9 Certificate Revocation and Suspension

#### 4.9.1 Circumstances for Certificate Revocation

Subscribers may request a Certificate Revocation based on their own decisions, provided that they must always request the revocation to the CAs in any of the following cases:

- There has been a change in information populated in the Certificate;
- the Private Key has or may have been compromised or no longer reliable for any reason, including the theft, loss, unauthorized disclosure or unauthorized use thereof;
- the Private Key has or may have been compromised to have lost the privacy or confidentiality.
- the Certificate is incorrectly populated or not being used for authorized purposes; or
- the use of the Certificate is being terminated.

The CAs may revoke the Certificate with or without the Subscriber's revocation request when the CAs are aware of the following situations:

- The Subscriber is not performing the obligations thereof under this CP, the CPS, relevant agreements or laws;
- · SECOM terminates the Services;
- · it is determined that the CA Private Key has or could have been compromised; or
- the CAs recognize any other situation deemed to necessitate revocation.

#### 4.9.2 Who Can Request Revocation

Certificate Revocation can be requested by representatives, employees or agents of the applicant organizations or institutions.

# 4.9.3 Procedure for Revocation Request

Certificate Revocation Request shall be submitted by post-mailing the information required for the revocation to the CAs. However, e-mail submission is allowed as an alternative in an emergency or when the said submission option is not available.

#### 4.9.4 Revocation Request Grace Period

Revocation Requests due to other than Private Key compromise shall be submitted to the CAs five (5) operational days prior to the desired revocation date. However, should a Subscriber determine that a Private Key has or could have been compromised, the Subscriber must promptly make a revocation request after identifying the compromise.

# 4.9.5 Time within Which CA Shall Process the Revocation Request

The CAs promptly revoke a Certificate upon accepting a valid Certificate Revocation Request.

# 4.9.6 Revocation Checking Requirements for Relying Parties

Before placing trust and using a Certificate issued by the CAs, Relying Parties must confirm that the Certificate has not been revoked by checking the CRLs or the OCSP responder.

#### 4.9.7 CRL Issuance Frequency

A new CRL is issued within a year from the latest CRL issuance as well as when a Certificate issuance or revocation is made.

#### 4.9.8 Maximum Latency for CRLs

A new CRL is issued and published in the Repository within 24 hours.

The CAs publishes the revocation reason together with the CRL in the Repository.

# 4.9.9 On-Line Revocation/Status Checking Availability

Certificate status information is provided online via the OCSP responder.

#### 4.9.10 On-Line Revocation/Status Checking Requirements

Before placing trust and using a Certificate issued by the CAs, Relying Parties must confirm the validity of the Certificate. If registered revocation is not confirmed with the CRL in the Repository, the Certificate Status provided through the OCSP server shall be checked.

OCSP responders operated by the CAs shall support the HTTP GET method, as described in RFC 6960 and/or RFC 5019.

The validity interval of an OCSP response is the difference in time between the thisUpdate and nextUpdate field, inclusive. For purposes of computing differences, a

difference of 3,600 seconds shall be equal to one hour, and a difference of 86,400 seconds shall be equal to one day, ignoring leap-seconds.

For the status of Subscriber Certificates:

- 1. OCSP responses must have a validity interval greater than or equal to eight hours;
- 2. OCSP responses must have a validity interval less than or equal to ten days;
- 3. For OCSP responses with validity intervals less than sixteen hours, then the CAs shall update the information provided via an Online Certificate Status Protocol prior to one-half of the validity period before the nextUpdate.
- 4. For OCSP responses with validity intervals greater than or equal to sixteen hours, then the CAs shall update the information provided via an Online Certificate Status Protocol at least eight hours prior to the nextUpdate, and no later than four days after the thisUpdate.

For the status of Subordinate CA Certificates:

The CAs shall update information provided via an Online Certificate Status Protocol

- i. at least every twelve months; and
- ii. within 24 hours after revoking a Subordinate CA Certificate.

If the OCSP responder receives a request for the status of a certificate serial number that is "unused", then the responder should NOT respond with a "good" status. If the OCSP responder is for a CA that is not Technically Constrained in line with this CP "7.1.5 Name Constraints", the responder must not respond with a "good" status for such requests.

The CAs should monitor the OCSP responder for requests for "unused" serial numbers as part of its security response procedures.

#### 4.9.11 Other Forms of Revocation Advertisements Available

This CA can distribute OCSP responses using stapling in accordance with RFC4366.

In this case, the CA ensures that the subscriber includes the OCSP response of the certificate in the TLS process. The CA will comply with this requirement for the subscriber after the service usage rules or the contract with the subscriber, or after the technical confirmation by the CA and the approval of the service manager.

# 4.9.12 Special Requirements Regarding Key Compromise

Refer to this CP "4.9.1 Circumstances for Certificate Revocation ".

#### 4.9.13 Circumstances for Suspension

The CAs will not suspend Certificates.

# 4.9.14 Who Can Request Suspension

Not applicable.

# 4.9.15 Procedure for Suspension Request

Not applicable.

# 4.9.16 Limits on Suspension Period

Not applicable.

#### 4.10 Certificate Status Services

# 4.10.1 Operational Characteristics

Certificate status is available to Subscribers and Relying Parties for confirmation through the OCSP responder.

# 4.10.2 Service Availability

The CAs maintain and manage the OCSP responder in order to allow 24x7 access to the Certificate status for confirmation. However, the OCSP responder may not be available temporarily at times due to maintenance or for any other reason.

# 4.10.3 Optional Features

No stipulation.

# 4.11 End of Subscription (Registry)

In terminating subscription of the Services, Subscribers are required to proceed with the service subscription termination procedure set forth in the relevant agreement therefor or the like.

# 4.12 Key Escrow and Recovery

#### 4.12.1 Key Escrow and Recovery Policy and Practices

The CAs will not Escrow the CA Private Keys.

# 4.12.2 Session Key Encapsulation and Recovery Policy and Practices

Not applicable.

- 5. Facility, Management, and Operational Controls
- 5.1 Physical Controls
- 5.1.1Site Location and Construction Stipulated in the CPS.
- 5.1.2 Physical AccessStipulated in the CPS.
- 5.1.3 Power and Air Conditioning Stipulated in the CPS.
- 5.1.4 Water Exposures Stipulated in the CPS.
- 5.1.5 Fire Prevention and Protection Stipulated in the CPS.
- 5.1.6 Media Storage Stipulated in the CPS.
- 5.1.7 Waste Disposal Stipulated in the CPS.
- 5.1.8 Off-Site Backup Stipulated in the CPS.
- 5.2 Procedural Controls
- 5.2.1 Trusted Roles
  Stipulated in the CPS.
- 5.2.2 Number of Persons Required per Task Stipulated in the CPS.
- 5.2.3 Identification and Authentication for Each Role Stipulated in the CPS.

# 5.2.4 Roles Requiring Separation of Duties Stipulated in the CPS.

#### 5.3 Personnel Controls

5.3.1 Qualifications, Experience, and Clearance Requirements Stipulated in the CPS.

5.3.2 Background Check Procedures Stipulated in the CPS.

5.3.3 Training Requirements Stipulated in the CPS.

5.3.4 Retraining Frequency and Requirements Stipulated in the CPS.

5.3.5 Job Rotation Frequency and Sequence Stipulated in the CPS.

5.3.6 Sanctions for Unauthorized Actions Stipulated in the CPS.

5.3.7 Independent Contractor Requirement Stipulated in the CPS.

5.3.8 Documentation Supplied to Personnel Stipulated in the CPS.

5.4 Audit Logging Procedures

5.4.1 Types of Events Recorded Stipulated in the CPS.

5.4.2 Frequency of Processing Audit Log Stipulated in the CPS.

5.4.3 Retention Period for Audit Log Stipulated in the CPS. 5.4.4 Protection of Audit Log Stipulated in the CPS.

5.4.5 Audit Log Backup Procedure Stipulated in the CPS.

5.4.6 Audit Log Collection System Stipulated in the CPS.

5.4.7 Notification to Event-Causing Subject Stipulated in the CPS.

5.4.8 Vulnerability Assessments Stipulated in the CPS.

5.5 Records Archival

5.5.1 Types of Records Archived Stipulated in the CPS.

5.5.2 Retention Period for Archive Stipulated in the CPS.

5.5.3 Protection of Archive Stipulated in the CPS.

5.5.4 Archive Backup Procedures Stipulated in the CPS.

5.5.5 Requirements for Time-Stamping of Records Stipulated in the CPS.

5.5.6 Archive Collection System Stipulated in the CPS.

5.5.7 Procedures to Obtain and Verify Archive Information Stipulated in the CPS.

5.6 Key ChangeoverStipulated in the CPS.

- 5.7 Compromise and Disaster Recovery
- 5.7.1 Incident and Compromise Handling Procedures Stipulated in the CPS.
- 5.7.2 Hardware, Software, and/or Data are Corrupted Stipulated in the CPS.
- 5.7.3 Entity Private Key Compromise Procedures Stipulated in the CPS.
- 5.7.4 Business Continuity Capabilities after a Disaster Stipulated in the CPS.
- 5.8 CA or RA Termination Stipulated in the CPS.

- 6. Technical Security Controls
- 6.1 Key Pair Generation and Installation
- 6.1.1 Key Pair Generation Stipulated in the CPS.
- 6.1.2 Private Key Delivery to Subscriber Stipulated in the CPS.
- 6.1.3 Public Key Delivery to Certificate Issuer Stipulated in the CPS.
- 6.1.4 CA Public Key Delivery to Relying Parties Stipulated in the CPS.
- 6.1.5 Key Sizes Stipulated in the CPS.
- 6.1.6 Public Key Parameters Generation and Quality Checking Stipulated in the CPS.
- 6.1.7 Key Usage Purposes Stipulated in the CPS.
- 6.2 Private Key Protection and Cryptographic Module Engineering Controls
- 6.2.1 Cryptographic Module Standards and Controls Stipulated in the CPS.
- 6.2.2 Private Key Multi-Person Control Stipulated in the CPS.
- 6.2.3 Private Key Escrow Stipulated in the CPS.
- 6.2.4 Private Key Backup Stipulated in the CPS.

6.2.5 Private Key Archive Stipulated in the CPS.

6.2.6 Private Key Transfer into or from a Cryptographic Module Stipulated in the CPS.

6.2.7 Private Key Storage on Cryptographic Module Stipulated in the CPS.

6.2.8 Method of Activating Private Key Stipulated in the CPS.

6.2.9 Method of Deactivating Private Key Stipulated in the CPS.

6.2.10 Method of Destroying Private Key Stipulated in the CPS.

6.2.11 Cryptographic Module Rating Stipulated in the CPS.

6.3 Other Aspects of Key Pair Management

6.3.1 Public Key Archival Stipulated in the CPS.

6.3.2 Certificate Operational Periods and Key Pair Usage Periods Stipulated in the CPS.

6.4 Activation Data

6.4.1 Activation Data Generation and Installation Stipulated in the CPS.

6.4.2 Activation Data Protection Stipulated in the CPS.

6.4.3 Other Aspects of Activation Data Stipulated in the CPS.

6.5 Computer Security Controls Stipulated in the CPS.

6.5.1 Specific Computer Security Technical Requirements Stipulated in the CPS.

6.5.2 Computer Security Rating Stipulated in the CPS.

6.6 Life-Cycle Technical Controls

6.6.1 System Development Controls Stipulated in the CPS.

6.6.2 Security Management Controls Stipulated in the CPS.

6.6.3 Life-Cycle Security Controls Stipulated in the CPS.

6.7 Network Security Controls Stipulated in the CPS.

6.8 Time-StampingStipulated in the CPS.

## 7. Certificate, CRL, and OCSP Profiles

## 7.1 Certificate Profile

The CAs shall meet the technical requirements set forth in this CP "2.2 Publication of Certificate Information", the CP 6.1.5— Key Sizes, and the CP "6.1.6 Public Key Parameters Generation and Quality Checking".

When the CAs issue a CA certificate of a subordinate CA or when a subscriber certificate is issued by a subordinate CA, the CAs shall generate non-sequential Certificate serial numbers greater than zero (0) and less than 2^159 containing at least 64 bits of output from a CSPRNG.

Certificates issued by the CAs are generated in the X.509 Certificate Format, using the fields specified in Table 7.1-1 Basic Certificate Profile Fields.

Field	Description
Version	Certificate Format Number *1
(Version number)	
SerialNumber	Unique numbers across the CAs *2
(Serial number)	
Signature	Identifier of the Digital Signature
(Digital Signature algorithm identifier)	algorithm used in the Services *3
Issuer	Information about the issuer
(Name of the issuer)	(specified by the CAs)
Validity	Validity period of the Certificate
(Validity period)	(From/to dates)
Subject	Subscriber information
(Name of the Subscriber)	
SubjectPublicKeyInfo	The Public Key algorithm identifier and
(Information of the Subscriber Public Key)	the Public Key data of the Subscriber
Extensions	See "7.1.2 Certificate Extensions" hereof.
(Extension fields)	

Table 7.1-1 Basic Certificate Fields

## 7.1.1 Version Number(s)

The X.509 Format version number of Certificates issued by the CAs is Version3.

## 7.1.2 Certificate Extensions

TA, TSA Certificates and Subordinate CA certificate issued by the CAs use the RFC 5280 compliant certificate extension fields specified in:

Table "7.1-2-1 Security Communication RootCA2 TA, TSA Certificate Extensions";

Table "7.1-2-2 Security Communication RootCA3 TA, TSA Certificate Extensions";

Table "7.1-2-3 Security Communication RootCA3 Subordinate CA Certificate

<sup>\*1</sup> The Certificate format number is set to Version3.

<sup>\*2</sup> Appended by a CA server when a Certificate is newly created.

<sup>\*3</sup> Used when digitally signing a Certificate.

## Extensions";

Table 7.1.2-1 Security Communication RootCA2 TA, TSA Certificate Extensions (Published before September 26, 2018)

Field	Description
authorityKeyIdentifier (2.5.29.35)	A 160-bit SHA-1 hash for CA Public Key
subjectKeyIdenrifier (2.5.29.14)	A 160-bit SHA-1 hash for Subscriber Public Key
keyUsage (2.5.29.15)	digitalSignature (Other usages than [keyCertSign] and [CRLSign] may be specified by the CAs as necessary.)
extendedKeyUsage (2.5.29.37)	id-kp-timeStamping (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.8) (Specified only with TSA)
certificatePolicies (2.5.29.32)	certPolicyId=1.2.392.200091.100.901.5 policyQualifierID=id-qt-cps qualifier=CPS=https://repository.secomtrust.net/SC-Root2/
cRLDistributionPoints (2.5.29.31)	URI:http://repository.secomtrust.net/SC-Root2/ SCRoot2CRL.crl (CRL distribution location in the directory)
Authority Information Access(1.3.6.1.5.5.7.1.1)	OCSP - URI:http://scrootca2.ocsp.secomtrust.net (OCSP server's access address)  * This field can be activated/deactivated per Certificate Application.

Table 7.1.2-2 Security Communication RootCA3 TA, TSA Certificate Extensions (Issued before September 26, 2018)

Field	Description
authorityKeyIdentifier (2.5.29.35)	A 160-bit SHA-1 hash for CA Public Key
subjectKeyIdenrifier (2.5.29.14)	A 160-bit SHA-1 hash for Subscriber Public Key
keyUsage (2.5.29.15)	digitalSignature (Other usages than [keyCertSign] and [CRLSign] may be specified by the CAs as necessary.)
extendedKeyUsage (2.5.29.37)	id-kp-timeStamping (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.8) (Specified only with TSA)
certificatePolicies (2.5.29.32)	certPolicyId=1.2.392.200091.100.901.7 policyQualifierID=id-qt-cps qualifier=CPS=https://repository.secomtrust.net/SC-Root3/
cRLDistributionPoints (2.5.29.31)	URI:http://repository.secomtrust.net/SC-Root3/ SCRoot3CRL.crl (CRL distribution location in the directory)
Authority Information Access(1.3.6.1.5.5.7.1.1)	OCSP - URI:http://scrootca3.ocsp.secomtrust.net (OCSP responder's access address)

Field	Description	
	* This field can be activated/deactivated per Certificate	
	Application.	

Table 7.1.2-3 Security Communication RootCA3 Subordinate CA Certificate Extensions (Issued after June 7, 2018)

Field	Description
authorityKeyIdentifier (2.5.29.35)	A 160-bit SHA-1 hash for CA Public Key
subjectKeyIdenrifier (2.5.29.14)	A 160-bit SHA-1 hash for Subscriber Public Key
keyUsage (2.5.29.15)	keyCertSign,cRLSign (Purpose of use for User Public Key)
extendedKeyUsage (2.5.29.37)	id-kp-timeStamping (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.8)
certificatePolicies	certPolicyId=1.2.392.200091.100.901.7
(2.5.29.32)	policyQualifierID=id-qt-cps
	qualifier=CPS=http(s)://repository.secomtrust.net/SC-Root3/
	*() is optional
basicConstraints	Subject Type=CA
(2.5.29.19)	pathLenConstraints (The CA sets as necessary)
cRLDistributionPoints	URI:http://repository.secomtrust.net/SC-Root3/SCRoot3CR
(2.5.29.31)	L.crl (CRL distribution location on the directory)
Authority Information	accessMethod
Access(1.3.6.1.5.5.7.1.1)	ocsp (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.48.1)
	accessLocation
	URI:http://scrootca3.ocsp.secomtrust.net (OCSP responder
	publishing location)
	accessMethod
	caIssuers (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.48.2)
	accessLocation
	URI:http://repository.secomtrust.net/SC-Root3/SCRoot3ca.c
	er (URL of the Subordinate CA Certificates)
	*Set each as needed

## 7.1.3 Algorithm Object Identifiers

The Algorithm OIDs used in the CA are as follows:

Algorithm	OID		
rsaEncryption	{iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549		
	pkcs(1) pkcs-1(1) 1}		
sha256WithRSAEncryption	{iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi (113549		

	pkcs(1)	pkcs-1(1) 11}			
sha384WithRSAEncryption	{iso(1)	member-body(2)	us(840)	rsadsi	(113549)
	pkcs(1)	pkcs-1(1) 12}			

#### 7.1.4 Name Forms

The CAs and the Subscribers are uniquely identified by the Distinguished Name defined conforming to the X.500 Distinguished Name.

Valid characters are specified for the Distinguished Name in Table "7.1.4-1 Valid Characters".

Table 7.1.4-1 Valid Characters

Alphabets	Numbers	Symbols	
[A] through [Z],	[0] through [9]	[:], [-], [.], and [blank]	
[a] through [z]			

#### 7.1.5 Name Constraints

No stipulation.

## 7.1.6 Certificate Policy Object Identifier

Policy OID of the Certificates issued by the CA are as indicated in the Table "1.2-2 OID (This CP)".

## 7.1.7 Usage of Policy Constraints Extension

No stipulation.

## 7.1.8 Policy Qualifiers Syntax and Semantics

Policy Qualifiers store the URL of the web pages on which this CP and the CPS are published.

# 7.1.9 Processing Semantics for the Critical Certificate Policies Extension

No stipulation.

#### 7.2 CRL Profile

CRLs issued by the CAs are generated in the X.509 CRL Format, using the fields specified in Table 7.2-1 Basic CRL Profile Fields.

Table 7.2-1 Basic CRL Profile Fields

Field	Description
Version (Version number)	CRL Format Number *1

Field	Description
Signature	Identifier of the Digital Signature
(Digital Signature algorithm identifier)	algorithm used by the CAs *2
Issuer	Information about the issuer
(Name of the issuer)	(specified by the CAs)
ThisUpdate	Date of CRL issuance
(Date of update)	
NextUpdate	Date of next CRL update
(Date of next update)	
RevokedCertificates	Information about the revoked
(CRL)	Certificates;
	SerialNumber (serial number); and
	RevocationDate (date of revocation)
	Reason code (reason for revocation)
	shall be specified.

<sup>\*1</sup> The CRL format number is set to Version2.

## 7.2.1 Version Number(s)

The CA shall use X.509 v2 CRLs as specified in RFC 5280.

## 7.2.2 CRL and CRL Entry Extensions

The CRLs issued by the CAs use the X.509 CRL Extension field.

reasonCode (OID 2.5.29.21)

Effective 2020-09-30, all of the following requirements must be met:

If present, this extension must not be marked critical.

If a CRL entry is for a Root CA or Subordinate CA Certificate, including Cross Certificates, this CRL entry extension must be present.

If a CRL entry is for a Certificate not technically capable of causing issuance, this CRL entry extension should be present, but may be omitted, subject to the following requirements.

The CRLReason indicated must not be unspecified (0). If the reason for revocation is unspecified, CAs must omit reasonCode entry extension, if allowed by the previous requirements. If a CRL entry is for a Certificate not subject to Baseline Requirements and was either issued on-or-after 2020-09-30 or has a notBefore on-or-after 2020-09-30, the CRLReason must not be certificateHold (6). If a CRL entry is for a Certificate subject to Baseline Requirements, the CRLReason must not be certificateHold (6).

If a reasonCode CRL entry extension is present, the CRLReason must indicate the most appropriate reason for revocation of the certificate, as defined by the CA within its CP/CPS.

In the CAs, the following reasonCode shall be used.

keyCompromise (1)

affiliationChanged (3)

<sup>\*2</sup> Used when digitally signing a CRL.

# superseded (4) cessationOfOperation (5)

Use the fields shown in Table "7.2-2 CRL Extension".

Table 7.2-2 CRL Extension

Field	Description
AuthorityKeyIdentifier (CA Key identifier)	A 160-bit SHA-1 hash for CA Public Key

#### 7.3 OCSP Profile

The CAs operates the OCSP responder in compliance with RFC6960 and 5019.

Effective 2020-09-30, if an OCSP response is for a Root CA or Subordinate CA Certificate, including Cross Certificates, and that certificate has been revoked, then the revocationReason field within the RevokedInfo of the CertStatus must be present.

Effective 2020-09-30, the CRLReason indicated must contain a value permitted for CRLs, as specified in this CP "7.2.2 CRL and CRL Entry Extensions".

## 7.3.1 Version Number(s)

The CA uses OCSP Version 1.

## 7.3.2 OCSP Extensions

The singleExtensions of an OCSP response must not contain the reasonCode (OID 2.5.29.21) CRL entry extension.

## 8 Compliance Audit and Other Assessments

8.1 Frequency and Circumstances of Assessment Stipulated in the CPS.

8.2 Identity/Qualifications of Assessor Stipulated in the CPS.

8.3 Assessor's Relationship to Assessed Entity Stipulated in the CPS.

8.4 Topics Covered by Assessment Stipulated in the CPS.

8.5 Actions Taken as a Result of Deficiency Stipulated in the CPS.

8.6 Communication of Results Stipulated in the CPS.

8.7 Self-Audit Stipulated in the CPS.

- 9. Other Business and Legal Matters
- 9.1 Fees
- 9.1.1 Certificate Issuance or Renewal Fees Stipulated separately in contracts.

9.1.2 Certificate Access Fees No stipulation.

9.1.3 Revocation or Status Information Access Fees No stipulation.

9.1.4 Fees for Other Services No stipulation.

9.1.5 Refund PolicyStipulated separately in contracts.

- 9.2 Financial Responsibility
- 9.2.1 Insurance Coverage

SECOM Trust systems shall maintain a sufficient financial resources in providing this CA.

9.2.2 Other Assets No stipulation.

9.2.3 Insurance or Warranty Coverage for End-Entities No stipulation.

9.3 Confidentiality of Business Information

## 9.3.1 Scope of Confidential Information

Information on individuals and organizations in the possession of SECOM as the CAs are subject to confidentiality with the exception of those that were explicitly published as a part of a Certificate, a CRL, this CP, or the CPS. SECOM does not disclose such information externally unless it is required by law or there is a prior consent of the relevant Subscriber. SECOM may disclose the information subject to confidentiality to a legal counsel or a financial adviser who provides advice in connection with such legal,

judicial, administrative or other procedures required by law. It may also disclose information subject to confidentiality to an attorney, an accountant, a legal institution or any other specialist who provides advice on corporate mergers, acquisitions or restructuring.

Subscriber Private Keys are deemed to be information to be kept confidential by the Subscriber's own responsibility. The Services in no circumstances provide access to these Keys.

Information contained in Audit Log and the Audit Reports themselves are subject to the confidentiality and within the Scope of Confidential Information. SECOM will not disclose such information to any external party in other situation than a case stipulated in "8.6 Communication of Results" of the CPS or unless it is required by law.

## 9.3.2 Information Not Within the Scope of Confidential Information

Information populated in Certificates and CRLs is not considered confidential. In addition, the following information shall not be subject to the confidentiality provisions herein:

- Information that is or came to be known through no fault of SECOM;
- information that was or is made known to SECOM by a party other than SECOM without confidentiality requirements;
- information independently developed by SECOM; or
- · information approved for disclosure by the relevant Subscriber.

## 9.3.3 Responsibility to Protect Confidential Information

SECOM may disclose confidential information retained as the CAs when required by law or there is a prior consent of the relevant Subscriber. In the event of the foregoing, the party having come to acquire the information may not disclose said information to a third party due to contractual or legal constraints.

## 9.4 Privacy of Personal Information

## 9.4.1 Personal Information Protection Plan

SECOM will use the personal information collected from the subscribers of our authentication service to the extent necessary for the operation of this CA, such as confirming the application details, sending necessary documents, etc., and confirming who is authorized. SECOM's privacy policy will be announced on SECOM's website (http://www.secomtrust.net).

#### 9.4.2 Information Treated as Personal Information

SECOM treats information defined as personal information based on domestic laws and regulations (such as information collected from subscribers of SECOM authentication

services) as personal information and manages it appropriately.

## 9.4.3 Information that is not considered Personal Information

SECOM treats personal information as specified in "9.4.2 Information Treated as Personal Information".

## 9.4.4 Responsibility for protecting Personal Information

SECOM shall not disclose any personal information of the other party that it has learned during the execution and termination of the contract to third parties, whether during or after the contract period. The personal information protection manager shall be appointed in the operation of this CA, and the personal information protection manager shall have employees engaged in the service comply with internal rules regarding the handling of personal information.

## 9.4.5 Notice and Consent regarding use of Personal Information

SECOM will not use personal information for any purpose other than the purpose of obtaining the consent of the certificate subscriber, except as provided by law. The personal number and specific personal information will be used for the purpose of use permitted by law and for the purpose of use with the consent of the certificate subscriber.

#### 9.4.6 Disclosure of Information with Judicial or Administrative Procedures

If disclosure is requested by law, rule, court decision/order, administrative agency order /instruction, etc., the personal information of the certificate subscriber may be disclosed.

## 9.4.7 Other Information Disclosure Conditions

No stipulation.

## 9.5 Intellectual Property Rights

Unless otherwise agreed to between SECOM and Subscribers, the following informative materials and data pertaining to the Services shall belong to the parties specified as below:

Subscriber	An asset belonging to SECOM
Certificate	
CRL	An asset belonging to SECOM
Distinguished	An asset belonging to an entity to which the Name is assigned
Name (DN)	as long as the fee for the Subscriber Certificate is properly paid
Subscriber	An asset belonging the possessor of the Private Key that

completes a Key Pair with the Public Key, regardless of how it
is stored or who possesses the storage medium
An asset belonging the possessor of the Private Key that
completes a Key Pair, regardless of how it is stored or who
possesses the storage medium
An asset (including the copyrights) belonging to SECOM
This CP, CPS may be reproduced provided that the original
document is properly referenced. It is published under the
Creative Commons license Attribution-NoDerivatives
(CC-BY-ND) 4.0.
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/4.0/

## 9.6 Representations and Warranties

## 9.6.1 CA Representations and Warranties

SECOM provides certification services including authentication of Subscribers and registration/issuance/revocation of Certificates conforming to the provisions of this CP and the CPS, and secures the reliability of the certification practice including that of the CA Private Keys.

The foregoing warranties by SECOM set forth in this CP and the CPS are in lieu of all other warranties, express or implied, or otherwise.

By issuing a Certificate, the CA or a Subordinate CAs make the certificate warranties listed herein to the following Certificate Beneficiaries:

- 1. The Subscriber that is a party to the Subscriber Agreement or Terms of Use for the Certificate;
- 2. All Application Software Suppliers with whom the Root CA has entered into a contract for inclusion of its Root Certificate in software distributed by such Application Software Supplier; and
- 3. All Relying Parties who reasonably rely on a Valid Certificate. The CA represents and warrants to the Certificate Beneficiaries that, during the period when the Certificate is valid, the CA has complied with Baseline Requirements and its Certificate Policy and/or Certification Practice Statement in issuing and managing the Certificate.

The Certificate Warranties specifically include, but are not limited to, the following:

## 1. Authorization for Certificate:

That, at the time of issuance, the Subordinate CA

i. implemented a procedure for verifying that the Subject authorized the

© 2004 SECOM Trust Systems Co., Ltd.

issuance of the Certificate and that the Applicant Representative is authorized to request the Certificate on behalf of the Subject;

- ii. followed the procedure when issuing the Certificate; and
- iii. accurately described the procedure in the CA's Certificate Policy and/or Certification Practice Statement;

## 2. Accuracy of Information:

At the time of issuance, the Subordinate CA

- i. implemented a procedure for verifying the accuracy of all of the information contained in the Certificate (with the exception of the subject:organizationalUnitName attribute);
- ii. followed the procedure when issuing the Certificate; and
- iii. accurately described the procedure in the CA's Certificate Policy and/or Certification Practice Statement;

## 3. No Misleading Information:

That, at the time of issuance, the Subordinate CA

- i. implemented a procedure for reducing the likelihood that the information contained in the Certificate's subject:organizationalUnitName attribute would be misleading;
- ii. followed the procedure when issuing the Certificate; and
- iii. accurately described the procedure in the CA's Certificate Policy and/or Certification Practice Statement;

## 4. Identity of Applicant:

That, if the Certificate contains Subject Identity Information, the Subordinate CA

- i. implemented a procedure to verify the identity of the Applicant in accordance with Section 3.2 and Section 7.1.4.2..2;
- ii. followed the procedure when issuing the Certificate; and
- iii. accurately described the procedure in the CA's Certificate Policy and/or Certification Practice Statement;

#### 5. Subscriber Agreement:

That, if the Subordinate CA and Subscriber are not Affiliated, the Subscriber and Subordinate CA are parties to a legally valid and enforceable Subscriber Agreement that satisfies the Baseline Requirements, or, if the Subordinate CA and Subscriber are the same entity or are Affiliated, the Applicant Representative acknowledged the Terms of Use;

## 6. Status

That the CA or Subordinate CA maintains a 24 x 7 publicly-accessible Repository with current information regarding the status (valid or revoked) of all unexpired Certificates; and

7. Revocation: That the CAs or Subordinate CA will revoke the Certificate for

any of the reasons specified in the Baseline Requirements.

The Root CA shall be responsible for the performance and warranties of the Subordinate CA, for the Subordinate CA's compliance with the Baseline Requirement, and for all liabilities and indemnification obligations of the Subordinate CA under the Baseline Requirements, as if the Root CA were the Subordinate CA issuing the Certificates

## 9.6.2 RA Representations and Warranties

The provisions of "9.6.1 CA Representations and Warranties" hereof shall apply.

## 9.6.3 Subscriber Representations and Warranties

Subscribers to the CAs shall bear obligations to:

- Provide the CAs with as accurate and complete information as possible that Subscribers may know of and promptly notify the CAs of any change in the information provided therein;
- · protect their own Private Keys from being compromised;
- · restrict the Certificate usage to those set forth in this CP and the CPS without violating any laws and regulations; and
- promptly request the CAs to revoke the Subscriber Certificate in case the Subscriber determines that the Private Key corresponding to the Public Key indicated therein has or may have been compromised, or there has been a change in the registered information.

## 9.6.4 Relying Party Representations and Warranties

Relying Parties of the CA Services shall bear obligations to:

- Trust Certificates issued by the CAs for use with the intended usage purposes of the CAs set forth in this CP and the CPS;
- ensure that the Certificate has not been revoked by checking the CRLs in the Repository or the OCSP responder in attempting to trust the Certificate;
- check the validity period of the Certificate to ensure that it has not expired in attempting to trust the Certificate;
- ensure that the Certificate signature can be authenticated by the CA Certificate in attempting to trust the Certificate issued by the CAs; and
- agree to bear responsibility as the Relying Party defined in this CP and the CPS in trusting and using the CA Certificates.

9.6.5 Representations and Warranties of Other Participants No stipulation.

## 9.7 Disclaimers of Warranties

SECOM is not liable for any direct, special, incidental or consequential damages arising in connection with the warranties stipulated in "9.6.1 CA Representations and Warranties" and "9.6.2 RA Representations and Warranties" hereof, or for lost earnings, loss of data, or any other indirect or consequential damages.

## 9.8 Limitations of Liability

SECOM is not liable for the provisions of "9.6.1 CA Representations and Warranties" and "9.6.2 RA Representations and Warranties" hereof in any of the following cases:

- Any damage arising from unlawful conduct, unauthorized use, negligence or any other cause not attributable to SECOM;
- any damage attributable to the failure of a Subscriber or Relying Party to perform its obligations;
- · any damage attributable to a Subscriber or Relying Party system;
- damages attributable to the defect or malfunction or any other behavior of SECOM's, Subscriber's, or Relying Party's hardware or software;
- any damage during the period that a Subscriber neglected to pay the subscription fee as set forth in the agreement thereof;
- damages caused by information published in a Certificate, a CRL or on the OCSP responder due to the reasons not attributable to SECOM;
- any damage incurred in an outage of the normal communication due to reasons not attributable to SECOM;
- any damage arising in connection with the use of a Certificate, including transaction debts;
- damages attributable to improvement, beyond expectations at this point in time, in hardware or software type of cryptographic algorithm decoding skills; and
- any damage attributable to the suspension of the CA Services, including that of the CAs, due to force majeure, including, but not limited to, natural disasters, earthquakes, volcanic eruptions, fires, tsunami, floods, lightning strikes, wars, civil commotion and terrorism.

#### 9.9 Indemnities

Each Subscriber and Relying Party shall indemnify and hold harmless SECOM and its related organizations upon applying for, accepting, and trusting Certificates issued by the CAs. Incidents subject to the foregoing include loss, damage, lawsuit, as well as misconduct, omission, act, delay or default that are attributable to any kinds of cost burden, which could have been caused by failure of the Subscriber to provide the latest and accurate information to the CAs. Such incidents also include various liabilities, loss, damage, lawsuit, as well as misconduct, omission, act, delay or default by each Subscriber or Relying Party that are attributable to any kinds of cost burden.

#### 9.10 Term and Termination

#### 9.10.1 Term

This CP goes into effect upon approval by the Certification Services Improvement Committee. This CP will in no way lose effect under any circumstances prior to the termination stipulated in "9.10.2 Termination" hereof.

#### 9.10.2 Termination

This CP loses effect as of the termination hereof by SECOM with the exception of the provisions stipulated in "9.10.3 Effect of Termination and Survival".

#### 9.10.3 Effect of Termination and Survival

Even in the event of termination of the use of a Certificate by a Subscriber or the termination of a service provided by SECOM, provisions that should remain in effect, due to the nature thereof, shall survive any such termination, regardless of the reasons therefor, and remain in full force and effect with respect to any Subscriber and the CAs.

## 9.11 Individual Notices and Communications with Participants

The CAs provide the necessary notices to Subscribers and Relying Parties through e-mail or in other written forms.

#### 9.12 Amendments

## 9.12.1 Procedure for Amendment

## (1) Critical revisions/amendments

SECOM notifies Subscribers and Relying Parties of amendments of this CP if the amendments thereof are determined to have an obvious impact on the activities for use of Certificates or CRLs by the Subscribers and Relying Parties, by publishing the post-amendment version of this CP (including the Version History/Description/Date) in the Repository, while refreshing the Major Version Number.

## (2) Non-critical revisions/amendments

SECOM notifies Subscribers and Relying Parties of amendments of this CP if the amendments thereof are determined to have no or less impact on the activities for use of Certificates or CRLs by the Subscribers and Relying Parties, by publishing the post-amendment version of this CP (including the Version History/Description/Date) in the Repository, while refreshing the Minor Version Number.

#### 9.12.2 Notification Mechanism and Period

If this CP is revised/amended, the prompt publication of the post-amendment version of this CP (including the Version History/Description/Date) in the Repository is deemed to

be the notification thereof to Subscribers and Relying Parties. Subscribers may make claims within a week of such notification, while the post-amendment version of this CP is deemed to be approved by the Subscribers unless any claim is made within the said period.

## 9.12.3 Circumstances under Which OID Must Be Changed

OID shall be changed if the Certification Service Improvement Committee determines that it is necessary.

## 9.13 Dispute Resolution Provisions

A party seeking to file a lawsuit, request arbitration, or take any other legal action against SECOM for the resolution of a dispute relating to the Services provided by the CAs, shall notify SECOM to this effect in advance.

## 9.14 Governing Law

Regardless of the locations of the CAs, Subscribers, or Relying Parties, the laws of Japan will apply to any dispute concerning the interpretation or validity of this CP and the CPS. Regarding the location for arbitration and court proceedings, the parties hereto submit to the exclusive jurisdiction of a dispute settlement institution located within Tokyo.

## 9.15 Compliance with Applicable Law

The CA shall handle cryptographic hardware and software in compliance with relevant export regulations of Japan.

## 9.16 Miscellaneous Provisions

#### 9.16.1 Entire Agreement

SECOM comprehensively stipulates its policy, warranties as well as the Subscriber and Relying Party obligations and other relevant matters in this CP, the CPS and the agreements for provision of the Services, and any agreement otherwise, whether oral, written, or implied, shall have no effect.

## 9.16.2 Assignment

When SECOM assigns the Services to a third party, SECOM may also assign its responsibilities and other obligations specified in this CP and the CPS.

## 9.16.3 Severability

Even if any provision of this CP or the CPS is deemed invalid, all other provisions stipulated therein shall remain in full force and effect.

In the event of a conflict between Baseline Requirements and a law, regulation or government order (hereinafter 'Law') of any jurisdiction in which the CAs operate or issue certificates, the CAs may modify any conflicting requirement to the minimum extent necessary to make the requirement valid and legal in the jurisdiction.

This applies only to operations or certificate issuances that are subject to that Law. In such event, the CAs shall immediately (and prior to issuing a certificate under the modified requirement) include in the CA's CPS a detailed reference to the Law requiring a modification of Baseline Requirements under this section, and the specific modification to Baseline Requirements implemented by the CAs.

The CAs must also (prior to issuing a certificate under the modified requirement) notify the CA/Browser Forum of the relevant information newly added to the CA's CPS by sending a message to questions@cabforum.org and receiving confirmation that it has been posted to the Public Mailing List and is indexed in the Public Mail Archives available at https://cabforum.org/pipermail/public/ (or such other email addresses and links as the Forum may designate), so that the CA/Browser Forum may consider possible revisions to Baseline Requirements accordingly.

Any modification to the CAs practice enabled under this section must be discontinued if and when the Law no longer applies, or Baseline Requirements are modified to make it possible to comply with both Baseline Requirements and the Law simultaneously. An appropriate change in practice, modification to the CA's CPS and a notice to the CA/Browser Forum, as outlined above, must be made within 90 days.

## 9.16.4 Enforcement

Indemnities and attorneys 'fees may be sought from parties for disputes arising from the contractual provisions of each prescribed document, damages, losses and costs relating to the parties' actions.

#### 9.16.5 Force Majeure

SECOM shall not be liable for any damages caused by natural disasters, earthquakes, eruptions, fires, tsunamis, floods, lightning strikes, disturbances, terrorism, or any other force majeure, whether or not foreseeable, If it becomes impossible to provide this CA, SECOM may suspend this CA until the situation ceases.

## 9.17 Other Provisions

No stipulation.